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Abstract. This article is a description of Sekulula Spaza Express, a business model to deliver goods to infor-
mal traders piloted in Khayelitsha and Nyanga in Cape Town, South Africa by Reciprocity, a consultancy 
based in South Africa. The Sekulula Spaza Express model was established by Reciprocity, with funding from 
PepsiCo, and tested and tracked over a period of 3 months from January to March 2010. The results allowed 
to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of last mile delivery in low income communities in the South 
African context, and identify the bottlenecks that need to be addressed in order to create a inancially viable 
business model. It also demonstrated the value of “learning by doing”, and the valuable learnings that can be 
gathered at little cost to understand the dynamics of last mile delivery and trading in very low income com-
munities. In this regard, Cape Town and its immediate surroundings present unique features, making the area 
an ideal testing ground for inclusive business models. 
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1. Background: South Africa’s dual economy
As is the case with most other aspects of its society, 
South Africa’s economy is characterized by a huge 
dichotomy and extremes. More than almost any-
where else in the world, vastly different levels of 
economic development coexist and co-depend on 
each other. One part of South Africa’s economy is 
highly developed, and endowed with all of the clas-
sic enablers that support modern economies, such as 
sound inancial institutions, excellent infrastructure, 
a few world class universities, a functional and gen-
erally eficient legal and regulatory system, and a 
small but eficient pool of qualiied human resources. 
A traveler landing in Johannesburg from California 
for a meeting in Sandton, the city’s main business 
district, would hardly notice any difference between 
that city and Los Angeles. 
The other part of South Africa’s economy func-
tions almost in a kind of parallel universe. In this en-
vironment, most of the economic structures are infor-
mal. Here, hundreds of thousands of informal 
entrepreneurs struggle to gain access to inancial ser-
vices, endure sub-standard infrastructure, have low 
skills levels and don’t have a legal existence, making 
it almost impossible for them to enforce contracts or 
enter into partnerships or formal agreements. Such 
entrepreneurs, and the economic ecosystem in which 
they function, are excluded from the formal 
economy. 
Figure 1. Entrance of a self-service spaza, Khayelitsha
Despite this dichotomy, revolving doors link the 
formal and informal economy. For instance, informal 
traders in the townships (as South Africa’s mainly 
black residential areas around formerly “white” cit-
ies are called) sell products that they buy wholesale 
from giant formal wholesalers that are strategically 
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located at the edge of the townships. 
The dynamics behind this duality are complex and of 
course not unique to South Africa.  It is the magnitude of the 
dichotomy which is speciic. It can at least partly be traced 
back to South Africa’s history of apartheid (white minority 
rule) that ended only in 1994. By and large, the pre-1994 for-
mal economy was white-managed and white-owned, while 
the informal economy was black. One of the central chal-
lenges of the post-1994 settlement and the advent of democ-
racy is to translate political power into economic inclusion 
for the majority of South Africans. Perhaps as a result of this 
speciic context, the challenge of integrating the “base of the 
pyramid” or low income communities into the mainstream 
economy is far more sensitive and politicized than in most 
other parts of the world.  
2. A gap in the market, but also an opportunity to 
link formal and informal? 
As in many other emerging economies, a signiicant portion 
of the retail needs of South Africa’s low income market is 
serviced by thousands of informal retailers, usually referred 
to in South Africa as “spazas” or “tuck shops”. Spazas typi-
cally sell essential household goods and local staples: food 
items such as cooking oil, sugar, maize meal, lour and 
snacks, household essential such as soap, parafin, candles, 
matches and disinfectants, but also cigarettes and prepaid air-
time for mobile phones, with the last two products often men-
tioned by spaza owners as signiicant revenue generators.
Estimates vary widely as to how many spazas exist in 
South Africa: by deinition, informal businesses don’t have 
any legal existence and are therefore not registered in any 
company registrar or database, so one has to rely on estimates 
and extrapolations. A recent conservative estimate by the 
University of the Western Cape (UWC) is that the number of 
spazas hovers around 100,0001, with a collective turnover es-
timated at R 7 billion (Around US $ 700 million). But the 
Bureau of Market Research estimated in 2006 that there 
might be as many as 750,000 spazas and hawkers, with a col-
lective turnover of R 35-50 billion2. Whatever their actual 
numbers are, spazas are undoubtedly a ubiquitous feature of 
South Africa’s townships, and considering that shopkeepers 
would typically have at least 3 or 4 dependants, spazas pro-
vide a livelihood for at least several hundred thousand people 
in South Africa. They also vary vastly in terms of size, so-
phistication and customer experience: Some are barely more 
than a hole in the wall selling cookies, snacks and sugar, 
while a few allow customers to enter the store and select their 
own items from the shelves. As a rule, however, customers 
are served by the store manager, limiting the sales opportuni-
ties that impulse purchases offer in self-service stores. This is 
partly the result of South Africa’s high crime rates, which 
makes spaza managers feel vulnerable to robberies and 
pilferage. 
The spaza model is under threat, however: As most spaza 
owners have little formal business training, and since they 
1 Source: A Charman; L Petersen; L Piper: “From local survivalism to foreign entrepreneurship: the transformation of the 
spaza sector in Delft”, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town
2  http://www.eprop.co.za/index.php/news/item/7487-Retailers-drive-into-the-township-market-threatens-spaza-shops
intrinsically depend on higher margins rather than volumes to 
be viable, they are ill-equipped to respond to the changing 
dynamics of South Africa’s low income market. Their market 
share has been put under huge pressure by large formal retail-
ers, as well as newcomers in the informal market: At the for-
mal level, companies like Shoprite Checkers and Pick n Pay, 
two of South Africa’s largest retail chains, are expanding in 
many large townships and are able to offer lower prices than 
spazas. Another major player is Walmart, the world’s largest 
retailer, which has purchased South Africa’s Massmart chain, 
owner of several giant wholesalers in the townships. At the 
informal level, local spaza 
owners face heavy competition from highly successful mi-
grant traders: Over the past 15 years, immigrants from other 
parts of the continent, especially Somalia, Ethiopia and 
Tanzania, as well as South Asia (mainly Pakistan and 
Bangladesh), have opened thousands of spaza shops around 
the country. These traders leverage informal inancial net-
works and social capital with business skills acquired over 
generations, and are competing iercely with local traders on 
price. 
Figure 2.  Sugar, maize meal, cooking oil and lour account for most 
sales in value
Low income consumers have arguably beneited from the 
increased competition in the form of lower prices. However 
local traders, which form the backbone of South Africa’s in-
formal businesses, and their dependants have suffered great-
ly. Their margins have been squeezed, and they have lost cus-
tomers to the competition. They typically lack the working 
capital needed to upgrade premises and make shops more 
appealing, or to gain better skills in bookkeeping or stock 
management. Owning and running a spaza shop in South 
Africa today involves very hard work, long hours, high risks 
and low returns. 
Despite this rather bleak picture, spazas should not be writ-
ten off: in fact, they could actually leverage some crucial 
competitive advantages. One such advantage is location: 
Like any convenience store, they can use proximity to their 
clients to attract foot trafic. Their second major competitive 
advantage is the intimate knowledge they have of local mar-
kets and trends: At the micro-level, spaza owners possess an 
expertise on South Africa’s low income market that larger 
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retail stores are unable to match. 
The challenge, in this context, is to enable spazas to use 
these competitive advantages and allow them to compete on 
a level playing ield. One way that spazas could collectively 
improve their position is by running more eficient delivery 
systems and ordering processes. Indeed, during the pre-ield 
immersion phase in Kliptown and Khayelitsha, Reciprocity 
found that many spazas tended to have particularly ineficient 
practices in this regard. 
•	 Delivery: Many spazas are one-man shows, where 
the owner typically closes his or her store several 
hours every week, during business hours, in order 
to purchase stock. Spaza owners usually purchase 
stock from giant wholesalers who operate from 
massive warehouses located in industrial areas on 
the edge of the townships. Typically, spaza owners 
make use of public transport (combi taxis) or hire 
pick-up trucks to get the purchased goods to their 
shop. Either way, this involves not only an oppor-
tunity cost (store closed during business hours sev-
eral times a week) but also an actual expense 
(transport fare or van rental fare) which typically 
varies between R 40 – R 60 (US $ 4 to US $ 6). 
•	 Ordering process: During the pre-ield study, Rec-
iprocity found that spaza owners tend to have lim-
ited stock management processes: The practice is 
often to simply top up on an ad-hoc basis when the 
store runs out of a particular product. On the other 
hand, many products that don’t sell gather dust on 
shelves and remain there long after their theoretical 
sell-by date. This translates into lost opportunities 
as well as wasted shelf space which could be used 
more eficiently. 
As a result of these indings, the Reciprocity team decided 
to focus on these two aspects in order to develop a business 
model that could help to ill a gap in the market, create em-
ployment, and ultimately increase the sales igures of the 
spazas. 
3. Testing a model: Determining the variables of 
the experimental protocol 
During the pre-ield phase, Reciprocity had to: 
• Identify the ideal location to run the pilot
• Identify the wholesalers willing to contribute to the 
research
• Understand how the informal retailers get their 
supplies, and the costs associated to their stock-
taking
• Identify and deine the research variables of a via-
ble supply model by way of a distribution service
• To start the business model, we had to: 
• Recruit and train a sales force
• Develop marketing tools adapted to the context of 
the informal retailers 
• Develop and implement a tool-pack speciically 
designed for the entrepreneur
• Establish and formalise a relationship with the sup-
plier, i.e. the wholesaler 
Figure 3. A logo and brand was developed during the pre-ield phase
The pre-ield surveys and focus groups helped Reciprocity 
to establish a set of independent variables that each play a 
role at one step along the value chain. These variables were 
each likely to inluence the outcome of the pilot, and each 
was linked to a speciic aspect of doing business in low in-
come communities: 
•	 The	proile	of the shop owner: for instance, is the 
shopkeeper a migrant or a local, male or female, 
old or young, etc? This was a fundamentally im-
portant aspect as many informal traders are entre-
preneurs by necessity rather than opportunity. 
There is no way of telling for sure what the most 
common characteristics of successful entrepre-
neurs are, and Reciprocity sought to challenge and 
test widely held assumptions about “entrepreneur-
ial migrants” vs. “local survivalists” and other pre-
conceived ideas. What we could presume however 
was that Sekulula’s prospects would be inluenced 
by whether or not the clients it seeks to serve had 
entrepreneurial drive or not. 
•	 The delivery vehicle: Should it be a truck, a bicy-
cle, a donkey cart, a tuk-tuk, or something else al-
together? Again, this variable sought, from a 
business perspective, to test assumptions about 
what kind of vehicle would be most suitable for de-
liveries. What is the best combination of cost ef-
fectiveness, terrain suitability, carrying capacity, 
cultural acceptability, while remaining compliant 
with safety regulations, etc. ? For instance, access-
ing some shops in informal settlements may be im-
possible for motorized vehicles, so the delivery 
mode would have to be suited to local terrain and 
infrastructure.  Or a vehicle may not be commonly 
used, increasing the dificulty of inding qualiied 
drivers and ensuring maintenance. In the case of 
Sekulula, the tuk-tuk turned out to be highly suc-
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cessful in terms of cost effectiveness, but inding 
licensed drivers was a challenge as experienced 
drivers are usually not qualiied on such vehicles.
•	 Should the pilot focus on a selection of the 10 
most popular products, or offer a universal ser-
vice ? From Sekulula’s perspective, it would be far 
more cost effective and easy to offer a limited range 
of the 10 or 15 most popular products sold by infor-
mal traders. But the service might only be of value 
to traders if Sekulula was able to deliver the entire 
range of product lines, including the marginal ones. 
This trade-off therefore needed to be tested in the 
ield. 
•	 How should the spaza send its order: a mobile 
phone application, a phone call, a fax, or something 
else ? While there is, for good reason, huge enthu-
siasm about mobile phone applications in low-in-
come contexts, the reality is that many traders are 
not necessarily able or willing to use such applica-
tions unless there is a clear advantage for them, and 
then only if such applications are easy to use and 
reliable. From a business perspective, the challenge 
was to ind which channel is most suitable and re-
alistically usable for a trader in a South African 
township, where smartphones are not yet ubiqui-
tous and more ‘traditional’ means of communica-
tion might be more familiar, effective and reliable. 
•	 Timeframe of order-taking: How much notice 
would wholesalers need from spaza owners to 
place their orders ? Assuming that wholesalers 
would accept to prepare orders from spazas to be 
picked up, how much time do they need to do so ? 
•	 Payment method: Cash or mobile money ? As 
with the previous point, mobile money payments 
are making fast inroads into payment systems in 
several parts of Africa, and there is indeed great 
interest in decashing transactions. The assumption 
needs to be tested in real life however: In fact, the 
experience of Sekulula showed that despite the ad-
vantages of mobile money payments, many traders 
and their customers still have a preference for 
physical cash transactions, which are perceived to 
be practical, easy, and totally reliable while mobile 
money payments may, in the local context and en-
vironment, be seen as complicated, costly (banks 
offering mobile money payments usually charge 
their customers per transaction), scary (what if I 
make a mistake and pay too much / too little) and 
potentially unreliable (unconirmed transactions 
resulting from network issues, etc).  
This list of variables and the business challenges Reciprocity 
sought to address illustrate that to successfully test a new 
business model, assumptions need to be set aside. 
Regardless of which independent variables were at play, 
the model needed to generate an income stream that covered 
the costs. 
The income stream of the model depended on the number 
of deliveries: At its simplest level, assuming a lat fee for 
each delivery, the level of revenue is simply a multiple of the 
number of deliveries made. With a more complex fee scale, 
factors such as distance covered, weight, volume and type of 
produce delivered could be made factored into the pricing 
model. For the purposes of the pilot, it was decided to ini-
tially experiment only with lat fees, as the business model’s 
basic potential viability needed to be established irst. 
Sekulula’s inancial outlows	 were mainly made out of 
operaio al osts su h as ehi le i a e, ai te a e, fuel, 
i sura e a d a salary for the dri ers. 
Figure 4. Area detail of Cape Town’s Philippi, Nyanga and Khayelitsha townships
Philippi / 
Crossroads
Khayelitsha /  
Site C
Khayelitsha /  
Site B
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Figure 5. Delivery in progress, Nyanga
4. Results and Learnings
Sekulula spaza express was tested and operated as a going 
concern over a period of 3 months, which enabled Reciprocity 
to gather reliable sales data, imagine the possible business 
models that could result from the pilot, and assess the level at 
which a delivery service can be economically viable. 
Reliable sales data: The live testing phase enabled us to 
collect detailed sales data which helped us to get unique in-
sights into the basket of products purchased by spaza shops, 
and therefore get a precise picture of consumption patterns in 
the households which shop for staples at these spazas. All 

























Figure 6. Breakdown of food products purchased by Sekulula cli-
ents. Data gathered from Sekulula sales 
The pilot allowed us to track a sample of 120 deliveries 
made to a client basis of ca. 100 spaza shops mapped in the 
areas of Gugulethu, Nyanga and Khayelitsha (the largest 
townships in Cape Town), located in a radius of ca. 15 km 
from the main wholesalers. Around 20 of these spaza shops 
became regular clients over the period. The average delivery 
value was R 835 (ca US $ 85). Around 43% of all goods pur-
chased on behalf of clients was made up of food products, 
while another 42% was made up of snacks and soft drinks. 
The remaining categories were household products (11%) 
and personal care products (3%). Remarkably, only 4 prod-
ucts accounted for half the total value of purchases in the 
“food” category: white sugar (18%), maize meal (corn lour, 
17%), rice (11%) and meat (7%). This type of data is very 
valuable to consumer goods companies, who often have only 
vague indications of how their products are positioned with 
spazas, and faint understanding of consumer preferences. 
The testing also became an appropriate way in which to track 
not only the type of products sold but also frequency, size of 
packaging, prices and payment methods. 
Two possible business models: The experience of testing 
the variables helped us to design two broad options for inclu-
sive business models that could ill gaps in the market identi-
ied during the study, while creating jobs and consolidating 
the local entrepreneurial ecosystem: 
1. An “owner-driver” model, in which the driver is a 
subcontracted entrepreneur of a wholesaler or a co-
alition of consumer goods companies, which would 
provide vehicle loan inance (similar models have 
been successfully used in South Africa by SAB-
Miller and mpact paper recycling)
2. An independent entrepreneur model, in which 
the driver is completely independent and the costs 
of operating the business are entirely covered by 
revenue
In an ideal world, the only model sustainable in the long 
run should be the independent entrepreneur model, which al-
lows the entrepreneur to succeed or fail on his or her own 
merits. But in this case, the owner-driver model could be seen 
as a useful irst step towards full autonomy. 






































in charge of 
vehicle related 
costs and all 
other costs
Potential for economic viability: Based on Sekulula’s 
revenue and expense projections, the break-even point is 
reached at 6 deliveries per day, and long-term proitability is 
reached around 10 deliveries per day. At 10 deliveries per day 
(on a basis of 5 days per week), the driver-entrepreneur’s op-
erating costs can be covered, and sustainable income levels 
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are reached. 
In a 10-delivery per day model, Sekulula could generate 
monthly revenue of R 8,000 (ca US $  800), compared to operat-
ing costs (fuel, insurance, phone, vehicle inance…) of R 4,250, 
generating a net monthly income of approximately R 3,750 (ca 
US $ 375) for the entrepreneur (i.e about R 125 or US $ 12.50 
per day). This is signiicantly above the average income in a 
South African low-income environment: an estimated 35% of 
South Africans live on less than R 20 per day.
3. Conclusion
Sekulula spaza express is a business model designed to ad-
dress a proven demand from informal retailers for more efi-
cient ways of managing deliveries and stock. Scaling up the 
model could potentially create hundreds of self-employment 
opportunities in low-income communities, while at the same 
time signiicantly improving the prospects of small informal 
retailers, who form the backbone of entrepreneurial activity 
at the base of the pyramid in South Africa. 
The Sekulula pilot has also demonstrated that there is a gap 
in the market for
• An eficient delivery system enabling spaza shop 
owners to outsource the task of stocking up on 
goods to an external party, and be delivered in the 
most cost-effective way
• An eficient ordering system that could help spaza 
owners to access up to date information on the low-
est prices available. 
At the conclusion of the pilot, the delivery service reached 
a maximum of 6 deliveries per day, and now needs to over-
come two signiicant bottlenecks to become viable:
Cash management: Ensuring cash low is a challenge, as 
the driver needs to have enough loat (in cash or on a bank 
account) to pay for goods upfront. The driver can also be at 
risk for theft given the amount of cash he is carrying. An ap-
propriate mobile money solution will address this issue, but it 
still needs to be tested. 
Logistics: Finding the most appropriate channel through 
which the spaza owner can place orders at the wholesaler, 
how to send these orders to wholesalers, and eficiently col-
lect the orders still needs to be further explored and tested: A 
mobile application that is usable on a feature phone and a 
smartphone would need to be developed in this regard. 
At least three categories of people at the base of the pyra-
mid would beneit from Sekulula’s success: The spaza shop 
owners would beneit from the cost savings of this approach, 
with better information on which wholesalers offer the lowest 
prices on which products, and capitalize on the delivery ser-
vice being able to bulk-buy on behalf of a number of spazas. 
They would also beneit from the ability to remain open to 
customers while their goods are being re-stocked. The own-
er-drivers of the delivery vehicles would beneit through 
employment and income generating opportunities, but also 
from the ability to run their own businesses. Finally, consum-
ers could beneit in the form of more cashless payments, and 
potentially lower prices for goods and services. 
Sekulula could be a sustai a le usi ess odel hi h a  
e s aled up a ross South Afri a, reai g e ploy e t op-
portu iies, ia le s all usi esses, a d o solidai g the 
a ility of i for al retailers fro  lo  i o e o u iies to 
o pete ith for al retailers a d uli aio als.
The cost of testing such pilots is low, with high returns are 
high in terms of knowledge gained. The pilot would also be 
replicable elsewhere in Africa.
On a broader level, the testing of Sekulula also constitutes 
an opportunity to ask to what degree businesses should also 
seek to inluence outcomes: Should inclusive or social busi-
ness models seek to simply respond to needs and expecta-
tions in the market as they are, or seek, on the contrary, to 
inluence consumer behaviour and social outcomes by “push-
ing” some products or services, for example more “nutri-
tious” or “healthy” products ? The case of Sekulula, which 
highlights the huge spending on white sugar, sweet drinks 
and processed foods in low income communities, illustrates 
this dilemma: Where does the social responsibility of busi-
ness to inluence consumer behaviour begin, and where does 
it end ? Questions such as these demonstrate the need for far 
more research and testing to be done in this ield. 
